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E. T .: The Extra-Textual in 
Constitutional Interpretation 
Gary Jacobsohn * 
"In reviewing laws for constitutionality, should our judges 
confine themselves to determining whether these laws conflict 
with norms derived from the written Constitution? Or may they 
also enforce principles of liberty and justice when the normative 
content of those principles is not to be found within the four cor-
ners of our founding document?" I In two oft-cited articles Profes-
sor Thomas C. Grey has answered these questions, contending 
that judges who appeal to sources beyond the written document 
are acting as the framers wished. The implications of this conclu-
sion are potentially far-reaching. For if Grey is right, then free-
wheeling judicial review can be justified even by reference to that 
most conservative of constitutional standards: the framers' inten-
tions. Who then will take seriously the case for principled judicial 
restraint? 
Grey claims that the natural rights tradition of the 18th cen-
tury created a reservoir of legally binding principles that could be 
drawn upon by judges as an unwritten constitution, supplemen-
tary to the written one. Rejecting this approach, some scholars 
have argued that the natural rights tradition is (and was originally 
perceived to be) irrelevant to constitutional interpretation.2 This 
article defends an intermediate position: that the written Consti-
tution was meant to embody the natural rights commitments of 
the framers, and that therefore judicial appeals to "higher law," 
for example, are not justifiable to the extent that they lead to a 
distinction between written and unwritten constitutions. From 
this perspective the positivists are correct in their insistence upon 
the exclusive authority of the written document, but fundamen-
tally misguided in their understanding of the nature of this docu-
• Professor of Political Science, Williams College. 
I. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Conslltution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 ( 1975 ). 
2. Eg., J. ELY, DEMOCIV\CY AND DiSTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980). 
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ment.3 Judges who accept this intermediate position will not feel 
free to invoke ideas of natural justice that are not grounded in the 
constitutional text. Yet neither will they read that text as if it were 
a business contract. 
At the outset we should note that all scholarly inquiry into 
the kinds of questions raised here should proceed in humble rec-
ognition of the largely circumstantial nature of the evidence at 
hand. Thus, for example, it is noteworthy (as well as a source of 
some considerable frustration) that at no time during the Conven-
tion that framed the Constitution was there any mention of what 
the founders understood to be a jurisprudence fit for the interpre-
tation of their creation. There are, of course, statements at the 
Convention and elsewhere that may be taken to be strongly sug-
gestive of jurisprudential preference, but conclusions based upon 
them must be qualified by the fact that they may only represent 
the views of individuals lacking authority to speak on behalf of 
the collective will we like to call original intent. With this caveat, 
we tum to the "unwritten constitution." 
I. JUSTICE, CONSTITUTIONALITY, AND 
JAMES WILSON 
Professor Grey has perceptively noted a characteristic Ameri-
can ambivalence: we tend to regard bad laws as unconstitutional, 
yet we also tend to regard judicial discretion as undemocratic and 
hence illicit.4 He refers to this contradiction as the "Aristotelian 
dialogue that punctuates American constitutional law."5 Grey's 
side of this dialogue can claim distinguished lineage, "the idea of 
judicial review on the basis of an unwritten constitution being part 
of the common intellectual heritage of revolutionary Americans. "6 
One of the revolutionaries cited by Grey in this context is 
James Wilson, whose views command particular respect in light of 
his reputation as "the most learned and profound legal scholar of 
his generation,"? and whose contributions during the constitu-
tional convention were exceeded only by those of James Madison. 
Wilson belonged to a group of scholar-statesmen-Jefferson and 
John Adams are others mentioned by Grey-whose legal argu-
mentation on behalf of the binding character of the unwritten fun-
3. I have elaborated on this argument in Jacobsohn. Hamilton, Positivism, and the 
Constitution: Judicial Discretion Reconsidered, 14 PoLITY 70 (1981). 
4. Grey, Origins of the Unwniten Conslliution: Fundamental Law in American Revol~-.....___ 
tionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978). 
5. ld 
6. ld at 881. 
7. I THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 2 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967). 
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damentallaw supplemented the earlier polemics of such activists 
as Otis, Dulany, and Samuel Adams.s Grey is not alone in this 
judgment; according to Alfons Beitzinger "[t]he conclusion is not 
expressly drawn but it is quite evidently implicit in Wilson's rea-
soning-the judiciary must interpret the Constitution in light of 
the higher controlling law."9 
That Wilson shared enthusiastically in the consensus regard-
ing the existence of scientifically based moral principles deducible 
from immutable principles of natural justice is not in doubt. He 
also subscribed to the fundamental belief that governments are 
instituted to protect the natural rights of their people. What the 
connection between these rights and the Constitution was per-
ceived to have been, however, and beyond that, what the intended 
role of the Supreme Court in this context was, are less clear. 
The place to begin is the Constitutional Convention, where 
the argument for an extra-textual mode of interpretation must ini-
tially confront the debate over the so-called revisionary power. 
Madison's Notes of .Debates in the Federal Convention inform us 
that on July 21 James Wilson moved that the national judiciary be 
associated with the executive in the revisionary power. According 
to Madison, Wilson then remarked as follows: 
The Judiciary ought to have an opportunity of remonstrating against projected 
encroachments on the people as well as on themselves. It had been said that the 
Judges, as expositor of the Laws would have an opportunity of defending their 
constitutional rights. There was weight in this observation; but this power of the 
Judges did not go far enough. Laws may be unjust, may be destructive; and yet 
may not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give them 
effect. Let them have a share in the Revisionary power, and they will have an 
opportunity of taking notice of the characters of a law, and of counteracting, by 
the weight of their opinions the improper views of the Legislature. 10 
Madison himself supported Wilson by arguing that the revi-
sionary power would be "useful to the Community at large as an 
additional check against a pursuit of those unwise and unjust 
measures which constituted so great a portion of our calamities." 11 
Interestingly, the opposition, which eventually prevailed on this 
issue, shared in the assessment of the likely impact of the propo-
sal. "It was making the Expositors of the Laws the Legislators," 
said Elbridge Gerry, "which ought never to be done."12 And, ad-
8. See Grey, supra note 4, at 887. 
9. Beitzinger, The Philosophy of Law of Four American Founding Fathers, 21 AM. J. 
JURIS. I, 17 (1976). 
10. THE fEDERAL CONVENTION AND THE fORMATION OF THE UNION 235 (W. Sol-
berg ed. 1958). 
II. ld at 236. 
12. ld at 237. 
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ded Luther Martin: 
A Knowledge of Mankind, and of Legislative affairs cannot be presumed to be-
long in a higher degree to judges than to the Legislature. And as to the Constitu-
tionality of laws, that point will come before Judges in their proper official 
character. In this character they have a negative on the laws. Join them with the 
Executive in the Revision and they will have a double negative. It is necessary 
that the Supreme Judiciary should have the confidence of the people. This will 
soon be lost, if they are employed in the task of remonstrating against popular 
measures of the Legislature.l3 
These comments are illuminating, if not entirely dispositive 
of questions concerning the jurisprudential significance of the 
higher law. Both sides assume the appropriateness of judicial re-
view, which they understand as the authority to nullify legislative 
enactments that are unconstitutional. But they seem clear that a 
holding of unconstitutionality (as distinguished from an exercise 
of the revisionary power) is not to be based upon judicial assess-
ments of the mere wisdom of legislation. The only way we can 
characterize Wilson, for example, as an advocate of an expansive 
policy-makingjudiciary is if we assume that, having lost the battle 
over the revisionary power, he altered his understanding of the 
constitutional role of the Supreme Court. 
Not entirely clear, however, from Wilson's argument, are his 
views on a related issue of special concern to us. He indicates that 
r //the defense of constitutional rights is a judicial function, but is not 
V explicit as to whether the "unwritten constitution" is a source of 
these rights. In this connection a question is raised that goes to the 
heart of the positivist's interpretation of the Constitution. Wilson 
says: "Laws may be unjust, may be destructive; and yet may not 
be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give 
them effect." It does not matter greatly whether we substitute 
"unjust," or "illegal," for Wilson's "unconstitutional." In any 
case, the thought is that improprieties are tolerable under the 
Constitution, as long as basic justice is not threatened. 
Wilson's law lectures provide additional insight into this mat-
ter. He addresses a broad range of topics, including the vexatious 
issue that so preoccupied legal theoreticians during the struggle 
for independence-whether a legislative enactment contrary to 
common right and reason is nevertheless valid. Wilson, who was 
consistently more critical of Blackstone than his fellow framers, 
takes up the question by focusing on the English legal philoso-
pher's contention (seemingly contradicted elsewhere in the Com-
13. Id at 238. 
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mentaries)I4 that no power existed that could control a 
parliamentary action contrary to reason. His rejection of this 
Blackstonian position accounts, in part, for the occasional associa-
tion of his name with the concept of an unwritten constitution. If 
in fact there was a power-the judiciary according to Wilson-
that could control Parliament, Wilson's readers might conclude 
that the source of this power must be an extra-textual one to 
which legitimate appeal could be made by judges acting in their 
official capacity. But a careful reading suggests difficulties in such 
an interpretation. 
Wilson quotes a follower of Blackstone, who happens to be 
the latter's successor in the Vinerian chair at Oxford: "We must 
distinguish between right and power; between moral fitness and 
political authority. We cannot expect that all acts of legislators be 
ethically perfect, but if their proceedings are to be decided upon 
by their subject, government and subordination cease."Is Wilson 
responds to this assertion by accepting the distinction between 
right and power, but adding that "I always apprehended, that the 
true use of this distinction was, to show that power, in opposition 
to right, was divested of every title, not that it was clothed with the 
strongest title, to obedience." 16 On this premise he finds it shock-
ing to imagine that "a thing manifestly contradictory to common 
reason" must be upheld by the courts. 
Were this the end of the matter, a strong case could be made 
for Wilson's support of the unwritten constitution. But the spe-
cific context for his discussion is a comparison of the British and 
American constitutional systems, one that leads him unequivo-
cally to prefer the latter. This preference is attributable, according 
to Wilson, to the fact that in the United States the legislative au-
thority is controlled by the superior law of the Constitution. All 
other law, such as the enactments of the legislature, must be 
deemed inferior, and therefore void when in conflict with the 
Constitution. Essentially this is the familiar claim of Hamilton's 
Federalist No. 78 and Marbury v. Madison. But, unlike those two 
arguments, Wilson's lecture is not intended as a defense of judicial 
review. His purpose rather is to demonstrate the superiority of the 
American constitutional scheme by explaining how it effectively 
14. Wilson notes the contradiction by quoting Blackstone to the effect that "on the 
two foundations of the law of nature, and the law of revelation, all human laws depend; 
that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict these." Wilson summarizes 
his reference here to the earlier use of Blackstone by exclaiming: "Surely these positions 
are inconsistent and irreconcilable." I THE WoRKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 7, at 328. 
15. ld at 327. 
16. Jd at 328. 
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resolves the dilemma posed by parliamentary supremacy. Thus, 
the Supreme Court, in upholding the Constitution (and Wilson 
nowhere suggests he means anything but the written document), 
provides both "a noble guard against legislative despotism"I7 and 
a way of avoiding the implications of Blackstone's analysis-that 
the validity of law is not affected by its being contrary to right 
reason. By strong implication, then, the only way the Constitution 
could function in this role is if these principles of reason were 
themselves implicit in the document. One must, therefore, be cau-
tious in ascribing to Wilson (and to others as well) positions on 
constitutional interpretation that may apply to the British situa-
tion, but which are at best anachronistic in the context of Ameri-
can improvements. Nothing, it bears emphasis, pleased Wilson 
more than that "the principles of our constitutions and govern-
ments and laws are materially better than the principles and gov-
ernment and laws of England."Is 
At the conclusion of his comparison of constitutions, Wilson 
includes an eloquent encomium to the institution of trial by jury, 
describing it as one of the greatest blessings of liberty. Indeed, its 
contribution to the basic purpose of government-the securing of 
rights-is so great that "it should be placed on the most solid and 
permanent foundation."I9 Thus, it is a mark of the superiority of · 
the American over the British system that here trial by jury in 
criminal cases is "constitutional" and not merely "legal," that is, 
supported by the legislature.2o Recalling Wilson's comments at 
the Convention, we might infer from this that the Constitution 
incorporates those attributes of justice essential for the protection 
of the people's natural rights. Appeals external to the charter are 
consequently obviated by the deliberate internalization of norms 
of right conduct. 
What this means in the context of the present Court, and in 
light of Professor Grey's concern that the judiciary not retreat 
from its role as an engine of social justice, is perhaps clearer now. 
The theory of natural rights that shaped much of the political 
thought of the founding generation represented a departure from 
traditional natural law theory-for example, the Christian version 
of Thomas Aquinas-in its minimalist objectives, all ultimately 
deducible from the right of self-preservation.2I It provided the 
17. ld at 330. 
18. /d at 77. 
19. !d at 333. 
20. !d 
21. This distinction is nicely elaborated in Berns, Judicial Review and the Rights and 
Laws of Nature, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 49. 
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conditions for peace but abjured the quest for the good life. That 
quest, it was assumed, might be taken up individually or collec-
tively as a matter of policy, and the constitutional system was built 
in anticipation of future efforts to contribute or add to the social 
justice of the system. Wilson's (and Madison's) statements at the 
Convention are consistent with the observation in the law lectures 
that "[a]mong all the terrible instruments of arbitrary power, deci-
sions of courts, whetted and guided and impelled by considera-
tions of policy, cut with the keenest edge, and inflict the deepest 
and most deadly wounds."22 Considerations of policy may either 
advance or hinder the quest for justice; they must, however, not 
intrude upon the domain of the judges, whose guardianship ex-
tends to constitutional rights, the necessary but not sufficient con-
dition for social justice. Much later, Justice Frankfurter was to 
insist repeatedly upon the distinction between constitutionality 
and wisdom,23 an insistence that clarified while it obfuscated. 
Thus, it served as a healthy reminder that the constitutionality of 
a policy does not signal its desirability; at the same time it perhaps 
obscured the insight derivable from Wilson, that the constitution-
ality of a policy does indeed connote its consistency with those 
minimum standards of justice that collectively represent a kind of 
constitutional wisdom. 
II. REVOLUTION, JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND 
JAMES OTIS 
As to Acts of Parliament. An Act against the Constitution is void; an Act against 
natural equity is void; and if an Act of Parliament should be made. in the very 
words on this petition, it would be void. The executive Courts must pass such 
Acts into disuse24 
These defiant words of James Otis, taken from his famous 
argument in the Writs of Assistance Case, occupy a prominent 
place in American history; indeed to John Adams they initiated 
the American Revolution.25 Professor Grey is only slightly less 
enthusiastic in his appraisal of Otis's arguments. For him, they 
serve to highlight the distinguished lineage of the unwritten con-
stitution as a source for judicial decision making. Otis's views 
were elaborated in his famous 1764 pamphlet, The Rights of the 
British Colonies Asserted and Proved, which, according to Grey, 
"suggests not only that legislative authority should be subject to 
22. I THE WORKS OF lAMES WILSON, supra note 7, at 299. 
23. See, e.g., Polish National Alliance v. NLRB. 322 U.S. 643. 650 (1944). 
24. 2 THE WoRKS OF JoHN ADAMS 522 (C. Adams ed. 1850). 
25. Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (Mar. 29, 1817), reprinted in 10 THE 
WoRKS OF JoHN ADAMS 247-48 (C. Adams ed. 1856). 
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theoretical legal constraints, but also that those restraints should 
be enforceable in court."26 
If there is an inflation of Otis's importance in Professor 
Grey's evaluation of his contribution to our constitutional tradi-
tion, it is only very slight; for indeed Otis should be viewed as a 
figure of substantial significance. But what he ultimately demon-
strates is not that our written Constitution is supplemented by an 
unwritten one. Instead, Otis shows the necessity, in a system such 
as ours, of a written constitution of a particular kind. This inter-
pretation of Otis embraces twin assumptions that have been ad-
verted to in the discussion of Wilson: first, that a written 
document is compatible with natural rights interpretation; and 
second, that the appeal to an unwritten constitution in the policiti-
cal context of parliamentary sovereignty (i.e. where there is no 
written constitution) serves as a weak, and probably erroneous, 
precedent for such an appeal where this political context has been 
repudiated. 
To see how Otis's appeal to the unwritten constitution per-
mits us ultimately to reject such a concept in constitutional adjudi-
cation, we begin with a perplexing ambiguity in his famous 
speech. Constitutional historians have understood Otis's appeal 
to the English constitution in large measure as an effort to con-
demn certain acts of Parliament as offensive to the principles of 
nature that give life to the fundamentallaw.27 With this, Grey, of 
course, agrees. But the relationship of these principles to judicial 
action does not evoke the same consensus. Grey, for example, in-
terprets Otis as suggesting the enforceability of natural law con-
straints by courts. Bernard Bailyn, on the other hand, doubts that 
this was his intent: 
[Otis] did not mean that courts could nullify statutory enactments. but only that 
the courts, in interpreting statutes in cases that come before them. may indicate 
their belief that "the Parliament have erred or are mistaken in a matter of fact or 
right. ... " Courts, Otis meant, are like public-spirited citizens. who have the 
obligation "to show [Parliament] the truth," but they have no authority to impose 
compliance; only Parliament could declare what is and what is not law.28 
In other words, the courts, precluded from institutional 
equality by the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, could not, 
as under the later doctrine of judicial review, legally enforce their 
constitutional objections; they could only voice them publicly and 
26. /d at 868. See a/so McLAUGHLIN, THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONALISM 120 (1932). 
27. £g.. E. CoRWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 77-78 (1955). 
28. I PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 417 (B. Bai1yn ed. 1965). 
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hope that their arguments would be sufficiently compelling to in-
duce change. This assessment comports with the English experi-
ence with the fundamental law which, according to the leading 
student of the subject, was not connected to the practice of judicial 
review.29 In seventeenth century England the idea of fundamental 
law essentially stood for "the principle that politics is subordinate 
to ethics, and . . . that in the last resort rebellion or revolution 
may be morally justifiable."Jo Whether or not Otis represents a 
departure from that tradition is the point at issue between Bailyn 
and Grey. In condemning the principle of taxation without repre-
sentation as a violation of "the law of God and nature," did Otis 
in fact seek judicial nullification of a law contravening the unwrit-
ten constitution?JI 
Interesting and intriguing as this question is, fortunately it is 
not one that needs to be resolved here. If Bailyn is correct, it is 
nevertheless possible that the Americans later borrowed from the 
tradition of appealing to principles of natural justice and equity, 
while they were institutionalizing their own unique practice of ju-
dicial review. And if Grey's version is correct, it does not follow 
that the previous assumptions about judicial prerogatives still ap-
plied after adoption of a written constitution establishing more or 
less coequal branches of government. As in judging, so in schol-
arly commentary about judging: the best precedents come from a 
factual context that parallels the present one. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Grey has succeeded in capturing 
Otis's intent, the fact remains that our earliest judges were func-
tioning in a poltical-constitutional context fundamentally different 
from the setting within which Otis delivered his famous senti-
ments. As Grey astutely notes, "[t]he new practice of establishing 
a written constitution, drawn up by a special representative con-
vention and ratified by the people influenced the place of unwrit-
ten law in constitutional theory."32 What this influence was, Grey 
leaves unaddressed.33 
29. J. GOUGH, fUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 206 
(1955). 
30. ld 
31. Grey does not assert categorically that this was Otis's intent. His qualified judg-
ment seems to be this: "Otis may have seen the courts as possessing an initial power to 
invalidate unconstitutional statutes, while believing that if Parliament persisted in support-
ing a statute declared unconstitutional, it should have the last word." Grey, supra note 4, 
at 873. 
32. Jd at 893. 
33. Grey maintained, in effect, that our early constitutional history evinces no disin-
clination by judges to appeal to the unwritten constitution in much the same way that 
earlier jurists had done. T. Grey, Judicial Review and the Unwrillen Constitution ( 1977 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association) (unpublished paper). 
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Perhaps the most significant contextual difference is the de-
mise of parliamentary sovereignty, although Grey, once again 
challenging Bailyn, claims that the eighteenth century theory of 
legislative supremacy had very little influence in the colonies.34 
This is not to say, however, that the doctrine was unimportant, for 
even if it failed to persuade the Americans, it certainly shaped 
their constitutional arguments, specifically their assertions of 
supremacy for the fundamental law. Grey reminds us that the 
"idea of an enacted constitution was relatively novel in 1760, 
while the idea of an ancient unwritten constitution compounded 
of custom and reason was comfortable and familiar in the Eng-
lish-speaking world."Js This is true enough, but it tells us little or 
nothing about the status of the unwritten constitution after our 
revolutionary success and subsequent legitimation of the written 
Constitution. 
Several decades ago Corwin asked why legislative sover-
eignty did not establish itself in our constitutional system, and his 
answer speaks directly to the issue before us. "In the American 
written Constitution, higher law at last attained a form which 
made possible the attribution to it of an entirely new sort of valid-
ity, the validity of a statute emanating from the sovereign people. 
Once the binding force of higher law was transferred to this new 
basis, the notion of the sovereignty of the ordinary legislative or-
gan disappeared automatically, since that cannot be a sovereign 
law-making body which is subordinate to another law-making 
body."36 
Corwin's understanding is consistent with the findings of a 
recent inquiry into the origin of judicial review in the United 
States. The author, Sylvia Snowiss, takes a fresh look at the his-
torical evidence, and by distinguishing three distinct periods in the 
early evolution of the American practice of judicial review, suc-
ceeds in generating insights that bear usefully upon the issue of 
the unwritten constitution.37 She shows that during the first pe-
riod (from Independence to the publication of Federalist No. 78) 
judicial review was still affected by the Blackstonian teaching on 
legislative omnipotence. While the explicit Blackstonian dogma 
was not acceptable, it nevertheless shaped the contemporary de-
bate between those who supported legislative supremacy against 
34. Gre). supra note 4, at 867. 
35. Id at 864. 
36. Corwin, supra note 27, at 89. 
37. S. Snowiss, From Fundamental Law to the Supreme Law of the Land· A Reinter· 
pretation of the Origin of Judicial Review in the United States ( 1981 Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association) (unpublished paper). 
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judicial power and those who appealed to the same fundamental 
law tradition that had attracted James Otis. This latter position 
held laws violating commonly accessible standards of political 
right to be void, but their illegality was not connected to a judicial 
determination to that effect. Thus, violation of the fundamental 
law had political significance, but the judiciary was not yet in a 
position to enforce pronouncements of voidness against legislative 
excess. During the second period (roughly from No. 78 to Mar-
bury v. Madison), the written Constitution emerged as a "vehicle 
for the explicitness of American fundamental law," thereby pro-
viding the basis for a decisive rejection of Blackstonian legislative 
supremacy.Js The explicitness, clarity, and public nature of the 
fundamental law removed the principal theoretical impediment to 
judicial enforcement of it; deference to legislative judgment on 
matters of constitutionality no longer seemed institutionally justi-
fied. The point is best articulated in Judge Tucker's opinion in the 
1793 Virginia case of Kamper v. Hawkins: 
This sophism [legislative sovereignty) could never have obtained a moment's 
credit with the world, had such a thing as a written Constitution existed before the 
American revolution. . . . What the constitution of any country was or rather was 
supposed to be. could only be collected from what the government had at any time 
done; what had been acquiesced in by the people, or other component parts of the 
government; or what had been resisted by either of them. Whatever the govern-
ment, or any branch of it had once done, it was inferred they had a right to do it 
again. The union of the legislative and executive powers in the same men, or 
body of men, ensured the success of their usurpations; and the judiciary having 
no .. rillen Constitution to refer to, were obliged to receive whatever exposition of it 
the legislature might think proper to make. But. with us, the Constitution is not 
an "ideal thing. but a real existence: it can be produced in a visible form:" its 
principles can be ascertained from the living letter, not from obscure reasoning or 
deductions only39 
This observation and the analysis by Professor Snowiss do 
not convey precisely the point Corwin, who emphasized higher 
law, was making; the two, however, can be read to suggest an in-
terpretation of judicial review that is difficult to reconcile with ex-
tra-textual sources for constitutional adjudication. The written 
Constitution emerges in this synthesis as a document appealing to V 
potentially contradictory jurisprudential aspirations. Thus, the 
constitutional positivist's yearning for order, predictability, and 
certainty are addressed by the codification of the fundamental 
law. But this codification cannot be viewed as valid simply as a 
result of its parchment form; it must (and does) satisfy the natural 
law proponent's insistence upon ethically grounded fundamental 
38. ld at 4. 
39. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (I Va. Cas.) 20, 77-78 (1793). 
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law. The traditional connection between fundamental law and 
right reason (Corwin's higher law) is maintained through the ab-
sorption of principles of natural justice in the charter itself. Had, 
in Judge Tucker's words, "such a thing as a written Constitution 
existed before the American revolution," then Otis's speech, we 
may speculate, might have impressed his contemporaries less as a 
revolutionary appeal (recall John Adams's reaction) than as a 
conventional, legal assertion of natural rights. When the princi-
ples of natural right have, in effect, been constitutionalized in 
written form, they transform revolutionaries into judges; that is, 
they replace rebellion with judicial review. 
In his Letters of Fabius, the conservative revolutionary, John 
Dickinson, allows us to reflect more deeply upon this point: 
If it be considered separately, a constitution is the organization of the contributed 
rights in society. Government is the exercise of them. It is intended for the benefit 
of the governed; of course can have no just powers but what conduce to that end: 
and the awfulness of the trust is demonstrated in this--that it is founded on the 
nature of man, that is, on the will of his Maker, and is therefore sacred. It is then 
an offence against Heaven, to violate that trust.40 
The excerpt makes much the same argument as the Declaration of 
Independence, but makes more explicit the relationship between 
constitutional law and natural law. Where there is no agent to 
enforce the sacred trust that underlies the Constitution, the clear 
implication, as in the Declaration, is that revolutionary action 
may be necessary to restore justice to the civil community. What 
is justice under a Constitution? The "organization of the consti-
tuted rights in society," rights founded on the nature of man. 
Under a written Constitution this organization exists for all to ob-
serve, but judges, under the Federalist theory of judicial review, 
bear a special responsibility to declare what the law (organized 
rights) is, and to enforce its content against transgressors-those, 
in other words, who dare to offend against Heaven.41 In so doing 
the judges civilize politics, thus obviating the necessity for 
revolution. 
In short, the eighteenth century doctrine of natural rights, es-
pecially the theory associated with John Locke, always contained 
revolutionary implications, and yet the same doctrine formed the 
basis for legitimate government. It was at once a radical and a 
conservative theory. For Otis, the judicial appeal to those princi-
ples served the revolutionary purposes of galvanizing sentiment 
40. PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 181 (P.L. Forded. 
1968). 
41. The special responsibility was severely criticized in Judge Gibson's famous opin-
ion in Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825). 
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against an illegitimate governance. On the other hand, the prac-
tice of judicial review involves the judiciary in a legitimizing role 
or function, the purpose of which is preservation, not changt:. 
Take, for example, Hamilton's famous argument in Federalist No. 
84 against a Bill of Rights. "The truth is, after all the declama-
tions we have heard, that the Constitution is itself in every ra-
tional sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF 
RIGHTS."42 Why, then, not enumerate them in detail? Because, 
as Herbert Storing has noted, such rights, while they provide the 
ultimate source and justification for government, can also threaten 
government.43 "Even rational and well-constituted governments 
need and deserve a presumption of legitimacy and permanence. 
A bill of rights that passes these first principles to the fore tends to 
deprive government of that presumption."44 The Hamiltonian ar-
gument was that the enumeration of rights was necessary in a 
political setting where the absence of a written Constitution re-
quired some alternative method of limiting royal or parliamentary 
prerogative; but that the American Constitution is itself a bill of 
rights, in that its grant of limited government (including the prac-
tice of judicial review) was an implicit articulation of those first 
principles upon which these familiar declarations of rights 
rested.4s Thus, by enforcing the language of the written Constitu-
tion, judges were indeed defending the same principles of right 
conduct represented in a declaration of particulars. 
Ultimately, of course, the Federalists reconciled themselves 
to a Bill of Rights, a development that does not affect the argu-
ment here. The Hamiltonian logic was not repudiated; judges 
were simply provided with greater specificity in enforcing consti-
tutional guarantees. Why, one must ask, need judges appeal to 
sources external to the document when those sources have, as it 
were, been internalized? 
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST 
PRINCIPLES OF FUNDAMENTAL LAW 
On August 22, 1787, a brief debate occurred at the Constitu-
tional Convention over the ex post facto change. Ellsworth of 
Connecticut contended that "there was no lawyer, no civilian who 
would not say that ex post facto laws were void of themselves. It 
42. THE fEDERALIST PAPERS 515 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
43. Storing, Tlte Constitution and the Bill o/ Rigltts, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 32, 46 (M. Judd Harmon ed. 1978). 
44. ld at 46. 
45. I have discussed this further in Jacobsohn. supra note 3. 
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cannot then be necessary to prohibit them."46 James Wilson con-
curred, claiming that inserting a constitutional prohibition would 
"bring reftexions on the Constitution-and proclaim that we are 
ignorant of the first principles of Legislation, or are constituting a 
Government which will be so."47 In opposition, Williamson of 
North Carolina indicated that "such a prohibitory clause is in the 
Constitution of North Carolina, and tho it has been violated, it 
has done good there and may do good here, because the Judges 
can take hold of it."4s From this debate Professor Grey concludes 
that "the validity of judicial review on the basis of unwritten first 
principles was supported as a matter of course by two important 
delegates, and implicitly disputed by no one."49 
How plausible is this interpretation? Ellsworth does indeed 
seem to believe in an unwritten constitution. But his reasoning 
applies only to well-settled principles, a rationale that would not 
extend to controversial applications of the concept. His logic 
would hardly apply, for example, to modem abortion cases. Wil-
son's argument is even less helpful to advocates of an unwritten 
constitution. He seems to have meant only that an ex post facto 
clause would imply congressional ignorance of "first principles"-
a weak argument, perhaps, but not one that helps Professor Grey's 
case. Wilson's statement can also be interpreted as an early for-
mulation of Hamilton's argument against a Bill of Rights. More 
specifically, perhaps his notion was that an ex post facto law is not 
"legislation," and therefore is beyond Congress' power, a position 
that would make the proposal superfluous and, again, would not 
enhance the case for an unwritten constitution. 
In any event, Williamson's view prevailed. His reference to 
enabling the judges to "take hold of it," while ambiguous, inclines 
more against than in favor of the concept of an unwritten 
constitution. 
It was not long before the ex post facto clause became a sub-
ject of judicial attention, and ultimately of scholarly concern. Let 
us consider some of the leading cases on which Professor Grey 
relies, beginning with Calder v. Bul/.so Justice Chase's opinion in 
Calder has figured prominently in the scholarly treatment of the 
uses of natural law in the American constitutional context.51 It is 
46. THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION AND THE FORMATION OF THE UNION, supra note 10, 
at 288. 
47. /d at 288. 
48. ld at 289. 
49. Grey, supra note 34, at 9. 
50. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
51. See, e.g., C. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 86-88 (1930); B. 
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typically juxtaposed with Justice Iredell's opinion in the same case 
to present a classic debate on the validity of natural law jurispru-
dence. At the outset, however, it should be noted that all the Jus-
tices agreed that the Connecticut statute alleged to have offended 
the ex post facto clause was not unconstitutional. 
Chase begins his examination by carefully limiting its scope. 
"The sole inquiry is whether this resolution or law of Connecticut 
. . . is an ex post facto law, within the prohibition of the federal 
constitution."s2 He then delivers himself of certain eloquent senti-
ments that do indeed demonstrate his attachment to the orthodox 
natural rights position: 
The purposes for which men enter into society will determine the nature and 
terms of the social compact; and as they are the foundation of the legislative 
power, they will decide what are the proper objects of it. The nature, and ends of 
legislative power will limit the exercise of it. This fundamental principle flows 
from the very nature of our free republican governments, that no man should be 
compelled to do what the laws do not require; nor to refrain from acts which the 
laws permit. There are acts which the federal, or state legislature cannot do, with-
out exceeding their authority. There are certain vital principles in our free repub-
lican governments, which will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant 
abuse of legislative power. . . . An act of the legislature (for I cannot call it a 
law), contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be consid-
ered a rightful exercise of legislative authority. The obligation of a law in govern-
ments established on express compact, and on republican principles, must be 
determined by the nature of the power on which it is founded. 53 
The critical sentence is that which denies the status of law to 
any legislative act "contrary to the great first principles of the so-
cial compact." This can be construed as an appeal to higher law 
outside of the Constitution only !f the great first principles of the 
social compact have not been incorporated within the document. 
Significantly, then, we find Justice Chase turning immediately to 
the specific language and intent of the constitutional prohibition, 
which he interprets narrowly in terms of its "technical"s4 mean-
ing. The result is a denial of its application to private rights of 
property or contract; the clause was meant to apply, he claims, 
only to criminal matters. What is more, "Every law that takes 
away or impairs rights vested [which this one did], agreeably to 
WRIGHT, JR., AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY 
OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 294 (1931); and ELY, supra note 2, at 210-11. Ely's treatment is in 
essential agreement with the interpretation provided here, although his assessment of 
Chase's opinion as "fiercely positivistic" goes beyond the claim of my argument. The most 
recent treatment of Calder v. Bull is in Currie, The Conslilulion in lhe Supreme Court: 1789-
1801, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 819 (1981). 
52. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 387. 
53. 1d at 388. 
54. Id at 391. 
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existing laws, is retrospective, and is generally unjust, and may be 
oppressive .... "55 But the fact that a law may be somewhat 
lacking in justice does not deprive it of constitutionality if it is not 
so deficient as to offend that basic level of justice guaranteed by 
the Constitution. We see, in short, an illustration of the point 
made earlier, that the Constitution is no guarantor of good laws, 
or even just laws, only laws that are compatible with the great first 
principles of republican, that is, free government.56 
To the extent that Justice Iredell's concurring opinion criticiz-
ing "speculative jurists" who hold "that a legislative act against 
natural justice must, in itself, be void,"57 was directed against Jus-
tice Chase, it does not do complete justice to his colleague's posi-
tion. Iredell surely differs from Chase, but, to use Grey's 
terminology, it is not a question of interpretivism versus noninter-
pretivism. Iredell writes that a law "within the general scope of [a 
legislature's] constitutional power," cannot be pronounced void by 
the Court "merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the 
principles of natural justice."5s To which Chase might have re-
plied that if intended for him the observation is internally contra-
dictory, because a law within the scope of constitutional power 
could not be contrary to the principles of natural justice. Iredell 
was an early constitutional positivist, believing in a separation of 
natural and constitutional law, although his commitment to writ-
ten Constitutions has caused him mistakenly to be understood as 
representing the jurisprudential orthodoxy of his times.59 It was 
Chase, and not Iredell, who stood for the received opinion in the 
formative years of the constitutional system. 
The case of Wilkinson v. Leland6o is less well-known, but sim-
ilarly instructive. Here, too, the Court upheld a statute against a 
claim that it violated the ex post facto clause. Justice Story's opin-
ion contains language reminiscent of Justice Chase's earlier opin-
55. ld 
56. Justice Paterson's opinion is also consistent with this observation. "I had an ar-
dent desire to have extended the provision in the Constitution to retrospective laws in gen-
eraL There is neither policy nor safety in such laws; and therefore, I have always had a 
strong aversion against them. It may, in general. be truly observed of retrospective laws of 
every discipline. that they neither accord with sound legislation, nor the fundamental prin-
ciples of the social compact. But on full consideration. I am convinced that ex post facto 
laws must be !united in the manner already expressed; they must be taken m theu techm-
cal, which is also their common and general, acceptation, and are not to be understood in 
their literal sense." ld at 397. 
57. Jd at 398. 
58. /d at 399. 
59. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
foURTEENTH AMENDMENT 252 (1977). 
60. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 ( 1829). 
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ion: "That government can scarcely be deemed to be free, where 
the rights of property are left solely dependent upon the will of a 
legislative body, without any restraint. The fundamental maxims 
of a free government seem to require, that the rights of personal 
liberty and private property should be held sacred."6 1 
The case is also noteworthy for the fact that the statute in 
question came from Rhode Island, which according to Story, was 
"the only state in the Union which has not a written Constitution 
of government, containing its fundamental laws and institu-
tions."62 This became a central issue in the complicated litigation 
involving a legislative ratification of a probate action that the de-
fendant claimed exceeded the authority of the state government. 
The legislation was acknowledged to be retrospective, but in a 
state without a written constitution how does one determine 
whether such a law is invalid? 
The Court heard two quite different answers to this question. 
Whipple, counsel for the plaintiff in error, argued: 
No other limit to the power of the legislature of Rhode Island is known, than that 
which is marked out by the Constitution of the United States. If any clause in 
that instrument is expressly or virtually infringed by the confirmatory act of 1792, 
such a violation would render the act a nullity. The national constitution being 
the only limitation, the court has no right to pronounce a law of Rhode Island 
void, upon any other ground. It has been said in England, that an act of Parlia-
ment, contrary to the principles of natural justice would be void. Such an opinion 
in reference to a law of a state, has never been intimated in this Court.63 
To this, Webster, counsel for the defendant in error, replied: 
It is of no importance to the question before the Court, whether there are restric-
tions or limitations to the power of the legislature of Rhode Island. imposed by 
the constitution. If, at this period, there is not a general restraint on legislatures, 
in favor of private rights, there is an end to private property. 
Though there may be no prohibition, the legislature is restrained from com-
mitting flagrant acts, from acts subverting the great principles of republican lib-
erty, and of the social compact. ... 64 
Ultimately, of course, the case would have to be decided on 
the basis of an interpretation of the Federal Constitution; but this 
debate, while perhaps not critical to the outcome, is nonetheless 
worth some reflection. Whipple's argument, for example, is more 
subtle than it may first appear. His rejection of the principle of 
voidness, used earlier by Otis, has an important implicit qualifica-
tion. The Court, he argues, has never accepted the formulation 
61. Id at 657. 
62. Id at 656. 
63. Id at 632. 
64. Id. at 646-47. 
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that, in the absence of an express prohibition, a law of a state that 
violates principles of natural justice is to be considered void. This 
leaves open the possibility that a law of the federal government 
would be a nullity if it contravened such principles. Thus, sixty-
five years after Otis made his declaration, the Supreme Court was 
still hearing faint repetitions of his argument, but the context had 
changed dramatically. How much so is marked by the fact that 
Whipple's interpretation of the only constitution relevant to the 
State of Rhode Island is confined to the specific language (and 
underlying intentions) of the document. Indeed, his examination 
of the ex post facto clause follows precisely Chase's reasoning in 
Calder v. Bull. There is no extra-textual interpretation of the Fed-
eral Constitution, although this Constitution is the only documen-
tary restraint upon the federal government, a government, 
according to the legal document, which inferentially is limited by 
the principles of natural justice. Thus, it follows that these princi-
ples must be embedded in the written fundamental law; that, in 
other words, Otis's appeal no longer relies upon the unwritten 
constitution. 
Whipple's legal brief would not command this much atten-
tion were it not for the fact that Justice Story's opinion is in essen-
tial agreement with it. Story nowhere accepts Webster's broad 
claim regarding the unwritten Constitution, choosing instead to 
find Rhode Island limited only by the express limitations of the 
federal Constitution. "We cannot say, that this is an excess ofleg-
islative power, unless we are prepared to say, that in a state, not 
having a written Constitution, acts of legislation, having a retro-
spective operation, are void .... "65 His reference, then, to the 
"fundamental maxims of a free government" must be seen in the 
context of an opinion that first refuses to embrace an explicit for-
mulation of the concept of an unwritten constitution and then pro-
vides a technical, some might say narrow, interpretation of the ex 
post facto clause of the written Constitution. It is difficult, in 
short, to see Wilkinson v. Leland as supportive of Professor Grey's 
thesis. 
The famous case of Fletcher v. Peck, 66 containing the Court's 
first interpretation of the contract clause, does appear to have an 
opinion based upon the unwritten constitution. Justice Johnson's 
separate opinion declares: "I do not hesitate to declare, that a 
state does not possess the power of revoking its own grants. But I 
do it on a general principle, on the reason and nature of things; a 
65. Jd at 661. 
66. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
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principle which will impose laws even on the deity."67 Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's opinion for the Court, on the other hand, demon-
strates a commitment to principles of natural right without 
abandoning the written Constitution. The state of Georgia, he 
claims, "was restrained, either by general principles which are 
common to our free institutions, or by the particular provisions of 
the constitution of the United States, from passing a law whereby 
the estate of the plaintiff. . . could be constitutionally and legally 
impaired and rendered null and void."6s Admittedly, the refer-
ence, in a separate clause, to general principles, might convey a 
commitment to extra-textual interpretation.69 However, in Ogden 
v. Saunders, 70 another famous contract clause case, Marshall indi-
cates that "the framers of our constitution were intimately ac-
quainted with the writings of those wise and learned men, whose 
treatises on the laws of nations have guided public opinion in the 
subjects of obligation and of contract."7I It would be logical to 
assume that the "particular provisions of the Constitution," ad-
verted to by Marshall in Fletcher, framed as they were by states-
men knowledgeable in the treatises that formulated the "general 
principles," were indeed intended to incorporate those strictures 
within the specific language of the relevant clauses. 
Terrett v. Taylor, n another case involving contract rights, is 
inconclusive on the question of the unwritten constitution. Justice 
Story does say: 
[T]hat the legislature can repeal statutes creating private corporations, or confirm-
ing to them property already acquired under the faith of previous laws, and by 
such repeal can vest the property of such corporations exclusively in the state ... 
we are not prepared to admit; and we think ourselves standing upon the princi-
ples of natural justice, upon the fundamental laws of every free government, upon 
the spirit and letter of the constitution of the United States, and upon the deci-
sions of most respectable judicial tribunals, in resisting such a doctrine.73 
But the opinion is quite ambiguous on the role that "natural jus-
tice" plays in deciding the case. One recent study, for example, 
suggests that the reliance on natural justice was at most an alter-
native holding, perhaps meant to express moral outrage at a stat-
ute that violated the ConstitutionJ4 Unlike Justice Johnson's 
67. ld at 143. 
68. ld at 139. 
69. See, e.g .. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: State and Congressional 
Poot:ers, 1801-18]5, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 887. 889-99 (1982). 
70. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). 
71. ld at 353-54. 
72. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815). 
73. ld at 52. 
74. Currie, supra note 69, at 902. 
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opinion in Fletcher, which explicitly relies on natural justice in-
dependent of the written charter, Story speaks of these principles 
in the same sentence in which he cites "the spirit and letter of the 
Constitution of the United States." Perhaps the passage was 
analogous to a first amendment opinion citing the Declaration of 
Independence and the works of Tom Paine, without meaning to 
imply that those documents would be legally sufficient substitutes 
for the constitutional text. Be that as it may, the ambiguity of 
Story's formulation renders problematic any final assessment of 
the case in the present context. 
Finally, there is Justice Paterson's opinion in Van Horne's 
Lessee v. Dorrance .75 In it we are treated to an explicit considera-
tion of the written Constitution, one that provides a fitting conclu-
sion to this article. Near the beginning of his opinion, Justice 
Paterson asks, "What is a Constitution?"76 This question occurs 
immediately after an inquiry into the authority of Parliament: 
[I]n England, the authority of the parliament runs without limits, and rises above 
control. It is difficult to say, what the constitution of England is; because, not 
being reduced to written certainty and precision, it lies entirely at the mercy of the 
parliament. . . . Some of the judges in England have had the boldness to assert. 
that an act of Parliament, made against natural equity, is void; but this opinion 
contravenes the general position, that the validity of an act of Parliament cannot 
be drawn into question by the judicial department: It cannot be disputed, and 
must be obeyed. The power of Parliament is absolute and transcendent; it is om-
nipotent in the scale of political existence. Besides, in England, there is no written 
constitution, no fundamental law, nothing visible, nothing real, nothing certain. 
by which a statute can be tested. In America, the case is widely different. . . 7 7 
It is interesting to note Paterson's non-recognition of British 
fundamental law and its relationship, in his estimation, to the ab-
sence of a written constitution. This takes on greater significance 
when, in response to his query about the nature of a constitution, 
he avers: "It is the form of government, delineated by the mighty 
hand of the people, in which certain first principles of fundamen-
tallaws are established."7s Here, in brief, is the rejoinder to Pro-
fessor Grey's thesis. The w1itten Constitution of the United States 
is the documentary embodiment of the fundamental law, of the 
first principles of government. When, then, in the next several 
paragraphs, Paterson invalidates the Pennsylvania statute, declar-
ing it to be "inconsistent with the principles of reason, justice, and 
moral rectitude," as well as "contrary both to the letter and spirit 
75. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 ( 1795). 
76. Jd at 308. 
77. !d 
78. !d 
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of the Constitution,"79 there is no question that these two sources 
of adjudication are inextricably linked in his mind, that the writ-
ten Constitution contains the principles of justice for which Pro-
fessor Grey seeks external justification. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The debate over the unwritten constitution, interesting as it is 
for the historian of ideas, should also be appreciated for its practi-
cal implications in contemporary constitutional adjudication. 
Professor Grey, who argues for the judicial enforceability of "the-
oretical legal constraints," is quite explicit in articulating the prac-
tical tendencies of his jurisprudential position.so We should 
understand that in the context of the modem Court's increasingly 
expansive definition of the scope of judicial review, the judicially 
enforceable unwritten law promises even more extensive constitu-
tional innovations than might otherwise occur. Thus, for exam-
ple, judges applying Grey's analysis to a "fundamental interest" 
claim under the fourteenth amendment, might readily perceive 
the wisdom and logic of going beyond the explicit text (and dis-
cernible intent) of the Constitution to evaluate the legitimacy of 
the claim and its corollary expectation of heightened judicial scru-
tiny.st Whether or not that is a good thing, the legitimation of the 
unwritten constitution, and the judicial mode of interpretation as-
sociated with it, surely makes the judiciary a more obvious partici-
pant in the governmental pursuit of a socially just society. 
In the end, perhaps, the best question to be raised in this con-
text, is one put forward by Grey himself. "Conceding the natural-
rights origins of our Constitution, does not the erosion and aban-
donment of the 18th century ethics and epistemology on which the 
natural-rights theory was founded require the abandonment of the 
mode of judicial review flowing from that theory? Is a 'fundamen-
tal law' judicially enforced in a climate of historical and cultural 
relativism the legitimate offspring of a fundamental law which its 
exponents felt expressed rationally demonstrable, universal and 
immutable human rights?"s2 That Grey's answer to his question 
is affirmative is indicated by his sympathy for the role of the con-
79. !d at 310. 
80. Thus, he connects his extra-textual approach to many of the social reforms facili-
tated by the work of the modern Court. Grey, supra note I, at 710-14. 
81. See, especially, San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez. 411 U.S. I ( 1973); Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). And note Grey, supra note I. at 712: "All of the 
'fundamental interests' that trigger 'strict scrutiny' under the equal protection clause would 
have to be discarded, if the interpretive model were to control constitutional adjudication." 
82. !d at 718. 
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temporary Court as "expounder of basic national ideals of indi-
vidual liberty and fair treatment, even when the content of these 
ideals is not expressed as a matter of positive law in the written 
Constitution."s3 Justice Paterson, who also believed in the role of 
the Court as expounder of national ideals (or, more accurately, 
because they were rooted in nature, supranational ideals), adhered 
to a conception of judicial review that differs from Grey's not on 
the basis of any disagreement over the validity of natural rights, 
but on the extent to which these rights were incorporated within 
the written document. Hence Paterson's conclusion: "The Con-
stitution of a State is stable and permanent, not to be worked upon 
by the temper of the times, nor to rise and fall with the tide of 
events: notwithstanding the competition of opposing interests, 
and the violence of contending parties, it remains firm and im-
movable .... "s4 To a great extent the future of constitutional 
law will reflect the competition between these alternatives. 
83. !d at 706. 
84. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 309. 
